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Apathy has been noted to be a very disabling
symptom in several neurological and psychiatric
disorders, especially dementia. There have been
several case reports and one open trial using
psychostimulants in the treatment of apathy (Ng
and O’Brien, in press). An early RCT in 44 with-
drawn and apathetic geriatric patients compared
methylphenidate with placebo (Kaplitz, 1975).
Methylphenidate was associated with a positive
outcome, but, by current standards, there were sev-
eral methodological shortcomings. Herrmann et al.
(2008) recently conducted a randomized double
blind crossover trial comparing methylphenidate
(10 mg b.i.d.) to placebo in 13 patients with
significant apathy. There were two phases of two
weeks with either drug or placebo separated by a
one-week washout. Patients demonstrated a signi-
ficant improvement on the primary outcome, the
Apathy Evaluation Scale, when on methylphenidate
but also had a greater proportion of adverse
effects. Two patients experienced severe adverse
events including agitation, delusions, irritability and
insomnia, which ceased when methylphenidate was
discontinued.
Whilst the Cochrane Review found no evidence
to support the general use of psychostimulants
in depression, including the newer medication
modafinil, the above studies would suggest that
this class of drugs may still have some potential in
old age psychiatry. Randomized placebo-controlled
studies are still needed as well as the study of
longer-term outcomes and potential adverse
effects.
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Neurodegeneration and the structure of time:
clinical evidence for philosophical reasoning
I enjoyed the recent editorial by Fo¨rstl (2008) on
time. Here he presents a different way of thinking
about what might be happening to people with
neurodegenerative diseases and the consequent dif-
ficulties for their carers. I was not so sure, however,
how the neuropathology was meant to contribute to
philosophical discussions about the nature of time.
A general point, which in my view explains why
so many discussions about the neurological basis
of mental experience simply miss the philosophical
concern, is that we can give both causal and
constitutive accounts of mental phenomena. We
can adapt the distinction made famous by Jaspers
(1923) between the explanations of natural science
(Erkla¨ren) and the understandings of human science
(Verstehen) and talk about causal explanation and
constitutive understanding. The neuropathology
of the dementias does indeed, as Fo¨rstl usefully
demonstrates, provide a causal explanation of the
mental phenomena that underpin the experience of
time for people with dementia. There is more to
be said, however, about the nature of time. That is,
further philosophical concerns relate to the concept
of time; and talk of the neuropathology simply
passes by such conceptual understanding. Nonethe-
less, Fo¨rstl also gestures at constitutive accounts of
time for people with dementia: the loss of the past
for those with Alzheimer’s disease; the loss of “a
laminar flow of consciousness” in dementia with
Lewy bodies; or the loss of a sense of the saliency of
the future in frontotemporal degeneration. Perhaps
it is these accounts, rather than the neuropathology,
that give us a better purchase on the conceptual
concerns of the philosophers.
As a way to add more detail to such accounts,
consider the descriptions given by Sabat (2001) in
which people with moderate to severe Alzheimer’s
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dementia, despite performing poorly on formal tests
of memory, demonstrated new learning by recalling
events or information from previous meetings with
Sabat. This might incline us to give further causal
explanations in terms of neuropathophysiology or
cognitive neuropsychology; it should also suggest
something about perspective. Some philosophers of
time are keen to emphasize that time is judged from
a perspective. Theories of relativity cause problems
for our normal perception that the present and
the future are distinct. The person with dementia
similarly demonstrates how the past might seem to
be the present. The interruption of the apparent
flow from past to present to future has something
to say about one of the other important theories
concerning time.
In 1908, McTaggart published his thesis that
time was not real (McTaggart, 1993). He distin-
guished between the “A series,” according to which
time has the properties of being past, present and
future; and the “B series” according to which
time can be ordered by thinking of things in
dyadic relations, as something being earlier than,
or later than, or simultaneous with something else.
McTaggart argued that the A series was essential
to time because it represented change and time is
the measure of change. According to McTaggart,
the B series does not capture this notion of essential
change, because it always represents time as set (as it
were in concrete): the discovery of amyloid plaques
and neuritic tangles occurred earlier than the cure
for Alzheimer’s disease, even though the cure has
not yet been achieved. These two times are set and
relative to each other without a sense of one having
been the present and now being the past and the
other being the future but potentially becoming the
present. Meanwhile, McTaggart argues that the A
series is incoherent, because any particular time,
in order to show change and thus be time, must
demonstrate all of the properties of past, present and
future. Yet this is incoherent because no time can
be past, present and future. Needless to say, there
have been various philosophical opinions about
McTaggart’s arguments!
The experience of dementia, however, is relevant.
It is possible in dementia to have a completely
coherent sense of one thing having happened before
something else, without a perfect sense of when
that might have been. The properties of the A
series may well be lost in the sense that change is
not recognized. I no longer recognize my wife, for
instance, because she is only 21-years old and the
woman in front of me is much older. But perhaps
I am happy enough to accept the help of the older
woman (or the care assistant) because I have a sense
of something like this having happened before, even
if I cannot point to the past when it occurred. This
would argue in favour of the properties of the B
series being a valid way to characterize time in some
sorts of dementia. Yet, recalling the point about
perspective, there may be other ways in which I
can measure change apart from by my (temporal)
memory; it may be that some form of emotional
memory (or connotation or recognition) allows me
to point to the past and anticipate the future, as
shown by the descriptions of Sabat (2001). In other
words, the properties of the A series ring true, and
yet it might be that at some points past and present
seem one.
In short, the real lives (the narratives perhaps) of
people with dementia provide fodder for philosoph-
ical ponderings. But this is more obvious in con-
stitutive accounts, which attempt to give us under-
standing of the lived experience of dementia, rather
than in the causal explanations of neuropathology.
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